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Abstract – JavaScript has evolved from a simple 
language intended to give web browsers basic 
interaction into a fully featured dynamic language that 
allows the browser to become an application delivery 
platform. With innovations such as asynchronous 
JavaScript and XML (AJAX) and JavaScript Object 
Notation (JSON), JavaScript has become the de facto 
standard for creating interactive web applications. With 
its new found power and popularity, JavaScript has 
been the target of many attacks. In this paper, we 
present a framework that allows programmers to define 
secure properties of JavaScript objects such that they 
are more immune to malicious activity and require a 
smaller footprint that existing solutions. We then use our 
framework and apply it to an already built JavaScript 
system to analyze its properties and effectiveness. 
INTRODUCTION 
JavaScript is an object-oriented scripting language that is 
primarily used in the form of client-side JavaScript, 
implemented as an integrated component of the web 
browser, allowing the development of enhanced user 
interfaces and dynamic websites. JavaScript is a dialect of 
the ECMAScript standard and is characterized as a dynamic, 
weakly typed, prototype-based language with first-class 
functions [1]. JavaScript is one of the world’s most popular 
programming languages due primarily to the fact that almost 
every modern personal computer has a web browser with a 
JavaScript interpreter installed on it. JavaScript's popularity 
is due entirely to its role as the scripting language of the 
internet [2]. 
Given JavaScript’s ubiquity and popularity, it has 
proven to be a common target for malicious activity. 
Modern web browsers provide a Document Object Model 
(DOM) API to JavaScript that allows script to interact with 
the browser and the pages that it renders to the user, but the 
DOM provides the potential for malicious authors to easily 
deliver code to clients. Malicious authors can easily deliver 
scripts that invoke DOM functionality such as redirecting 
the user’s browser, possibly to a malicious web site. Most 
web browsers attempt to mitigate this risk using two 
restrictions. First, all scripts run in a sandbox environment 
where they only have access to the web browser and not the 
system itself. Second, scripts are constrained by the same 
origin policy, where loaded in one document do not have 
access to data and scripts loaded in another document. Most 
JavaScript-related security problems are breaches of one of 
the two restrictions [1]. In addition, insecure JavaScript 
engineering practices often open new attack vectors. In 
many cases, security does not receive sufficient attention 
due to the complexity of web based applications, the ad hoc 
process of development, and the fact that many web 
designers do not have the necessary security knowledge on 
web development techniques [3]. It comes as no surprise 
that website security breaches are common and web-based 
applications are more susceptible to attacks than other 
traditional applications [4]. 
One of the main vulnerabilities in web applications is 
that one document may load scripts from many different 
sources. Each script loaded into a particular document by 
default has access to all of the data and functionality of each 
of the other scripts loaded into that document. This is often 
necessary for activities such as the inclusion of advertising 
[5] and analytics tracking [6]. A study of 6,805 popular web 
sites in 15 different categories revealed that at least 66.4% 
of analyzed sites have insecure practices such as including 
scripts from external sources into the top-level documents of 
their homepages [3]. 
 
 <script type="text/javascript"> 
var gaJsHost = (("https:" == document.location.protocol) ? 
"https://ssl." : "http://www."); 
document.write(unescape("%3Cscript src='" + gaJsHost + "google-
analytics.com/ga.js' type='text/javascript'%3E%3C/script%3E")); 
</script>       
 
FIGURE 1 
A SINPPET OF JAVASCRIPT BASED ON WWW.CS.UIUC.EDU WHERE A SCRIPT 
FROM A DIFFERENT SOURCE IS LOADED INTO THE TOP LEVEL DOCUMENT OF 
THE SITE 
 
Another common JavaScript vulnerability is its ability 
to dynamically generate and execute source code. The 
eval() function is provided by the JavaScript engine and 
evaluates a string containing JavaScript code as if it was 
part of the source loaded with the document. Malicious 
authors often use this ability to deliver code at runtime that 
adversely impacts the document. The same study mentioned 
above found that over 74.9% of analyzed web sites use one 
or more types of JavaScript dynamic generation techniques, 
and calls to the eval() function exist in 44.4% of 
analyzed web sites. Based on running several popular web 
sites and JavaScript tests through an instrumented 
JavaScript engine, a study found that changes to live objects 
are not uncommon, with adding fields to objects being the 
most frequent modification. While deletion of fields was not 
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detected in the tests, it was found to occur on several web 
sites [7]. 
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
eval(“alert(‘Hello, world!”); 
</script>       
 
FIGURE 2 
A SINPPET OF JAVASCRIPT SOURCE DEMONSTRATING THE USE OF THE 
EVAL() FUNCTION 
 
To help programmers secure their scripts from attacks, 
we present the HotSausage JavaScript framework [8]. The 
HotSausage framework contains several modules to allow 
JavaScript programmers to richer sets of functionality than 
what the environment provides by default, such as privacy, 
collections, and templates. For this paper, we focus on the 
privacy module, which allows programmers to secure 
properties of objects in secure locations and only grant 
designated functions of objects access to those protected 
properties. By including the HotSausage framework in a 
document, an author has the ability to write code that is 
more immune to attack than it would be alone. 
This paper will explore the functional abilities of the 
privacy module, how it interacts under various possible 
attacks, performance penalties incurred by using it, and the 
next steps that we are taking to enhance the framework. 
Lastly, we will investigate a case study where the 
HotSausage framework was applied to a working JavaScript 
system to demonstrate its abilities in a typical setting. We 
aim to show that by being conscientious of security when 
writing JavaScript source code, authors can mitigate many 
common attack vectors targeted at their applications. 
MOTIVATION 
Web browsers define the origin of a document to include the 
protocol used to load it and the domain name and port that it 
was loaded from. Although a document can only be loaded 
from one source, there is no such restriction on the origin of 
scripts that are included in a document. Under the same-
origin policy, JavaScript cannot access another document 
that has a different origin, but it does have full access the 
document in which it was included even if its origin is 
different from its parent’s document [9].  
It is possible then for a document author to 
unknowingly include a JavaScript script in his document 
that has malicious intent and full access to all other data in 
the document. It is common practice for authors to include 
scripts for functionality such as libraries and frameworks in 
their document from external script hosting sites to reduce 
the burden of updating local copies when new versions of 
the script are released or to reduce load on their hosting 
servers. Providers such as Yahoo! offer scripts in this 
manner [10]. Such script hosting sites may become popular 
targets of attack, due to the ease of distributing malicious 
code to a large user base if the hosting site was 
compromised. There are alternative methods to mitigate this 
risk, but often times they are not compatible with the 
document author’s design intentions or are overlooked [3]. 
In addition, the eval() function is especially 
dangerous. It takes a single string parameter and evaluates it 
as JavaScript source without reference to a particular object, 
but with the same privileges as the function’s caller [11]. If 
the eval() function is present in a script, an attacker could 
try to leverage its power to evaluate a string of malicious 
code with the privileges of the caller. In addition, since 
often times eval() is used to run dynamically generated 
scripts, it is near impossible to effectively filter out 
malicious code from valid code [3]. 
We aim to reduce the chances that a malicious script 
could alter data of JavaScript objects that have strict security 
and integrity requirements. By utilizing our framework, 
authors can be confident that their data will remain secure 
and immune to attack. 
HOTSAUSAGE 
The HotSausage JavaScript framework aims to provide 
JavaScript programmers with a rich set of functionality that 
is not provided by the standard library. The base 
HotSausage module contains general settings for the 
framework along with setup and structure for all the sub-
modules it contains. One example setting is the ability to 
handle errors quietly. If enabled, the framework will not 
throw errors on error conditions but rather silently ignore 
them. The framework is further decomposed into several 
sub-modules, each with its own distinct purpose. 
The collections module provides authors with a set of 
data structures that can be used to store collections of data. 
It features predefined objects such as lists and spans of 
elements that feature rich APIs similar to what a 
programmer would expect from other languages, such as 
Java or C#. 
The purpose of the Templates module is to enable 
programmers to program using pure prototypal semantics.  
While JavaScript inherently prototypal, its inconsistent 
object creation syntax obscures its prototypal basis, leading 
many programs to try to write programs from a classical 
class-based approach.  Furthermore, this schizophrenic 
nature around object creation creates usability issues for 
programmers, which causes some common and serious bugs 
which are tricky to debug and are visually difficult to locate 
in source code.  Using the HotSausage Templates module 
enables programmers to avoid these headaches, and use a 
pure and consistent approach to object creation and build 
object types. 
The final module in the HotSausage framework is the 
privacy module. Its responsibility is to provide objects with 
the capability to store protected properties in a secure 
“purse” that is only accessible by author designated 
functions. Accesses to the purse of an object are secured 
with a one-time session key that is only valid when invoked 
in the scope of the framework. In addition, there are several 
layers of checks that are performed when accessing 
protected properties that ensure that only authorized access 
is allowed. 
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I. Getting Started with HotSausage 
To use the HotSausage JavaScript framework, script authors 
must first include the compiled source file containing the 
framework. Currently, we only support loading the 
framework from the same host as the origin of the document 
where it will be used, but in the future we plan to implement 
a script hosting service for the code. To mitigate risk of 
malicious authors compromising the script host, we plan to 
distribute hash checksums of the code to authors and include 
a built-in hashing mechanism in the framework that will 
authenticate itself when it is loaded. 
As soon as the source code is loaded in the document, 
the framework automatically registers itself as a global 
object available to all other scripts called HotSausage. 
All sub-modules of HotSausage, such as collections, 
templates, and privacy automatically register themselves as 
HotSausage.Collections, 
HotSausage.Templates, and 
HotSausage.Privacy respectively. It is then the 
responsibility of the document author to call the 
HotSausage.installCoreMethods() function to 
finish initializing the framework. This function augments 
several of the JavaScript global objects, such as Object and 
Function to include extra functionality that the framework 
provides. It accomplishes this task by adding fields to the 
prototypes of these objects. 
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
HotSausage.installCoreMethods(); 
</script>       
 
FIGURE 3 
A SINPPET OF JAVASCRIPT SOURCE DEMONSTRATING THE INITIALIZATION 
OF THE FRAMEWORK 
 
HOTSAUSAGE PRIVACY MODULE 
The privacy module provides authors the ability to secure 
protected properties of JavaScript objects in secure 
containers. Once the HotSausage framework is loaded into a 
document and is initialized, all of its features are available 
to script authors, including privacy, but privacy features are 
not extended to any objects unless an author explicitly 
enables them for a type of object. This requirement reduces 
overhead since only objects requiring privacy features will 
require the extra processing demanded by HotSausage when 
they are instantiated and evaluated.  
II. Getting Started With the Privacy Module 
When an object has privacy featured enabled, a container 
that we call a purse is attached to it, which is used to store 
properties of the object that authors wish to protect. The 
purse is only available in the functional block in which 
privacy was enabled and in any functions that the author 
designates as privileged. We made a design decision to 
reveal a direct reference to the purse when privacy is 
enabled hoping that script authors will have the foresight not 
to leave access to that reference available outside of the 
constructor of an object.  
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
var Person = function (ssn) { 
     var purse = this.enablePrivacy(); 
     purse.ssn = ssn; 
     //it is the author’s responsibility to not disclose the 
     //the reference to the purse here 
}; 
</script>       
 
FIGURE 4 
A SINPPET OF JAVASCRIPT SOURCE DEMONSTRATING HOW TO ENABLE 
PRIVACY ON AN OBJECT AND STORE PROPERTIES IN ITS PURSE 
 
As seen in (4) and steps p1-p2 in (19), once privacy is 
enabled, the programmer gets direct access to the purse for 
that object where he can store whatever properties he would 
like. The reference to the purse is only valid inside of the 
functional block in which privacy is enabled, which in this 
case is the constructor of the object. The security and 
integrity of the privacy for the Person object would be 
compromised if the author assigned the purse reference to a 
variable declared in a different scope than the constructor or 
defined a function that returned the purse reference inside 
the constructor. As stated earlier, we will count on script 
authors to be mindful of these restrictions and write their 
scripts accordingly. We also to plan to include these 
restrictions in the documentation that is shipped with the 
framework and in the wiki for the project to raise awareness 
of this potential attack vector to users of the framework. 
The reference to the purse that is received when calling 
enablePrivacy() is the only direct reference that 
objects will have to their purses. Any other accesses to the 
purse can only come from functions which the script author 
as designated as privileged. 
Lastly, after enablePrivacy() is called, a new 
function called _purse() is added to that object as seen in 
p5 in (19). This function takes a session key and if the key 
provided is correct, stores the purse for that object in a 
location that is only accessible by the framework. The use of 
this function will be described below. 
III. Adding Privileged Methods to Objects 
When installCoreMethods() is called to initialize 
the framework, several methods are added to global 
JavaScript objects. The two methods that the privacy 
module installs are 
Object.prototype.privilegedMethod and 
Function.prototype.privilegedMethod. Both 
of these functions have the same purpose, but act slightly 
different. Since Function inherits from Object, objects 
of type Function will inherit Function’s version of 
privilegedMethod while all other JavaScript objects 
will inherit Object’s version. 
Both of these functions serve the same purpose, to 
install a function on the object on which it was called that 
has access to the purse of that object. Function’s version 
of privilegedMethod adds a privileged method to the 
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prototype of the object on which it was called, while 
Object’s version adds the privileged method to the object 
itself that it was called on. 
The function privilegedMethod takes two 
parameters, a string containing the name that the author 
wishes the new function to have and a function containing 
the implementation of the new method as seen m1 in (19). 
When writing the implementation of the new privileged 
method, the author must make a special consideration. The 
reference to this in the implementation will refer not to 
the object that the method is being added to, but rather to the 
purse of that object. By default, the purse is populated with 
two properties: 
• owner – a reference to the object which owns the 
purse 
• _hspv – which is reserved for future use by the 
framework 
 
Any other properties that the programmer added to the purse 
at any other time are also available. 
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
Peron.privilegedMethod(“getSSN”, function () { 
     return this.ssn; 
}); 
var personImpl = new Person(“123-45-6789”); 
personImpl.getSSN(); //returns “123-45-6789” 
</script>       
 
FIGURE 5 
A SINPPET OF JAVASCRIPT SOURCE DEMONSTRATING HOW TO PROPERLY 
ADD A PRIVILEGED METHOD TO AN OBJECT 
 
IV. Locking the Framework 
After the script author has defined all of the objects that are 
required for his script, it is necessary to lock the framework 
to prevent an attacker from simply adding a new privileged 
method to an object at run time and accessing an object’s 
purse. To accomplish this task, HotSausage provides a 
lock() function that prevents this from happening. By 
calling HotSausage.lock(), the author prevents any 
further addition of privileged methods to objects, but the 
functions to enable privacy on an object remain so that 
objects constructed after the framework was locked will still 
succeed.  
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
HotSausage.lock(); 
</script>       
 
FIGURE 6 
A SINPPET OF JAVASCRIPT SOURCE DEMONSTRATING HOW TO PROPERLY 
LOCK THE FRAMEWORK 
 
After HotSausage.lock() is called, the properties 
Object.prototype.privilegedMethod and 
Function.prototype.privilegedMethod are 
deleted. Any attempts to add them back by an attacker will 
not have access to any object’s purse because the new 
functions will not be defined within the scope of the 
framework, which is necessary to access purses. A potential 
problem with our approach is that if an attacker does in fact 
redefine these functions, they will appear to work properly 
for the script author with no warning given, but the worst 
possible outcome is that the functions that are added to the 
object requested will not work as expected; there will be no 
accesses to the purse of that object. 
V. Privileged Method Internals 
When an author calls the privilegedMethod function, 
the framework does much more than simply adding the 
implementation function as a property of the object it was 
called on. 
First, the implementation function is wrapped in 
another function that gains access to the purse of the object 
to which the method is being added as seen in m2 and m3 in 
(19). The details of this access will be described below. 
After the wrapper function has successfully gained access to 
a reference to the purse, it uses JavaScript’s 
Function.prototype.apply method to execute the 
implementation function, passing the reference to the purse 
as the context to which the implementation function is 
evaluated in as seen in m4 in (19). This is how the reference 
in the implementation function references the purse and not 
the behavior object to which the implementation function 
belongs. The result of evaluating the implementation 
function is stored in the wrapper and is compared to the 
purse. If the result of the implementation function is not the 
purse, that result is returned, otherwise the purse’s owner is 
returned. This last check mitigates the attack where a 
malicious author could write a privileged method using the 
framework to try to expose a reference to an object’s purse 
by returning it. 
A current limitation is that an attacker could create an 
additional privileged method that assigns its own reference 
to the purse to a variable declared in a larger scope. We 
currently have no defense against this type of attack, so it is 
imperative that programmers write their privileged method 
implementations carefully and lock the framework once 
they have finished. 
VI. Purse Access Internals 
As mentioned earlier, when adding privileged methods to 
objects, the framework wraps their implementation with 
another function that is responsible for mediating the 
execution of the implementation function, including gaining 
it a reference to the purse of the object that it is attached to. 
The framework internally has a function defined called 
__purseOf() which takes a single parameter, an object, 
and returns the purse of that object as seen in (19). The 
wrapper function mentioned above calls this function to 
retrieve a reference to an object’s purse. It does this by first 
generating a one-time session key. This key is only visible 
within the framework and is only valid for the time in which 
__purseOf() is executing. Inside of the privacy module, 
there exists an object that is simply a holder for properties 
called the _activeTransporter as seen in (19) 
labeled aHashMap. The __purseOf() function stores a 
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dummy reference in the slot of the 
_activeTransporter designated by the generated key, 
then calls the object’s _purse() method, supplying it the 
session key as seen in e4 in (19). The _purse() function 
takes the reference to the purse of its object and stores it in 
the _activeTransporter in the slot where the dummy 
reference was as seen in e5 in (19). 
If an attacker was to call the _purse() function with 
an invalid session key, all that would happen is that the 
_purse() function would store a reference to the purse 
inside the framework’s _activeTransporter where it 
will never be read. 
Once the _purse() function terminates, the 
_purseOf() function retrieves the reference to the purse 
from the _activeTransporter and returns it back to 
the privileged method’s wrapper function as seen in e6 in 
(19). 
VII. Privacy Module Security Checks 
Earlier, we mentioned that the HotSausage framework made 
several security checks during execution and threw errors if 
the checks resulted in a condition that violated the security 
policy. A programmer can write JavaScript code that 
monitors for these errors and take action depending on 
which errors are thrown. Below we will describe several 
potential attacks against the framework and how the 
framework responds. 
Given that an attacker knew that there were two types 
of objects, both with privacy enabled and both with a purse 
property of the same name. If the attacker knew that object 
A had a privileged method that returned the protected 
property of the name he was looking for in object B, but 
object B did not have a privileged method that revealed that 
property, he might try to reassign the privileged method 
from object A to object B. 
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
var Employee1 = function (ssn) { 
     var purse = this.enablePrivacy(); 
     purse.ssn = ssn; 
}; 
 
Employee1.privilegedMethod(“getLastFourOfSSN”, function () { 
     return this.ssn.substring(this.ssn.length-4, 4); 
}); 
 
var Employee2 = function (ssn) { 
     var purse = this.enablePrivacy(); 
     purse.ssn = ssn; 
}; 
 
HotSausage.lock(); 
 
var e1 = new Employee1(“123-45-6789”); 
var e2 = new Employee2(“987-65-4321”); 
 
var e1ssn = e1.getLastFourOfSSN() //returns “6789” 
 
e2.prototype.getLastFourSSN = e1.prototype.getLastFourOfSSN 
var e2ssn = e2.getLastFourOfSSN(); //throws error 
</script>       
 
FIGURE 7 
A SINPPET OF JAVASCRIPT SOURCE DEMONSTRATING THE PRIVILEGED 
METHOD REASSIGNING ATTACK 
 
In this case, the framework would cause a JavaScript 
error to be thrown that would indicate that the privileged 
method had been moved. This check is performed inside the 
function that wraps the privileged method’s implementation, 
and compares the object that it was originally attached to to 
the current value of this. 
Another attack exists where two objects both have 
privacy enabled on them and with private properties of the 
same name, but one object has privileged methods to access 
all of its private properties which the second object does not. 
An attacker may try to reassign the _purse() function of the 
inaccessible object to the accessible object so that accessing 
privileged methods of the accessible object would actually 
reference the purse of the inaccessible object. 
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
var Employee1 = function (ssn) { 
     var purse = this.enablePrivacy(); 
     purse.ssn = ssn; 
}; 
 
Employee1.privilegedMethod(“getLastFourOfSSN”, function () { 
     return this.ssn.substring(this.ssn.length-4, 4); 
}); 
 
var Employee2 = function (ssn) { 
     var purse = this.enablePrivacy(); 
     purse.ssn = ssn; 
}; 
 
HotSausage.lock(); 
 
var e1 = new Employee1(“123-45-6789”); 
var e2 = new Employee2(“987-65-4321”); 
 
var e1._purse = e2._purse; 
 
var e1ssn = e1.getLastFourOfSSN(); //throws error 
</script>       
 
FIGURE 8 
A SINPPET OF JAVASCRIPT SOURCE DEMONSTRATING THE PURSE ACCESSOR 
METHOD REASSIGNING ATTACK 
 
This attack will cause an error to be thrown because the 
__purseOf() function mentioned earlier will 
successfully execute the _purse() function that was 
transplanted, but it then checks that the owner property of 
the retrieved purse matches the object on which the 
privileged method was called. When that check fails, an 
error will be thrown. 
Third, an attacker might try to redefine the _purse() 
function of an object that had security enabled on it to either 
try to reveal the purse or break the object. Although the 
purse will still be secure if the _purse() function is 
redefined improperly, privileged methods will no longer 
function properly as the actual purse will not be accessible. 
The framework will detect that the invalid _purse() 
function did not properly modify the 
_activeTransporter object since it did not have 
access to it, so a counterfeit _purse() function must have 
existed and an error will be throw. 
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
var Employee = function (ssn) { 
     var purse = this.enablePrivacy(); 
     purse.ssn = ssn; 
}; 
 
Employee.privilegedMethod(“getLastFourOfSSN”, function () { 
     return this.ssn.substring(this.ssn.length-4, 4); 
}); 
 
HotSausage.lock(); 
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var e1 = new Employee(“123-45-6789”); 
 
//attacker code 
e1._purse = function (key) { 
     var purse = {}; 
     purse.ssn = “987-65-4321”; 
     return purse; 
}; 
 
e1.getLastFourOfSSN(); //throws error 
</script>       
 
FIGURE 9 
A SINPPET OF JAVASCRIPT SOURCE DEMONSTRATING THE PURSE ACCESSOR 
METHOD REDEFINING ATTACK 
 
Fourth, a malicious author might try to call the 
_purse() function of an object with privacy enabled 
many times to guess the session key. Although guessing the 
correct session key while that key is alive will only give the 
framework access to the purse, it may give the attacker the 
ability to guess the next keys that are generated. A valid 
_purse() function will detect invalid session keys and 
cause an error to be thrown if errors are not set to be 
handled quietly. 
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
var Employee = function (ssn) { 
     var purse = this.enablePrivacy(); 
     purse.ssn = ssn; 
}; 
 
Employee.privilegedMethod(“getLastFourOfSSN”, function () { 
     return this.ssn.substring(this.ssn.length-4, 4); 
}); 
 
HotSausage.lock(); 
 
var e1 = new Employee(“123-45-6789”); 
 
//attacker code 
e1._purse(Math.random()); //throws error 
</script>       
 
FIGURE 10 
A SINPPET OF JAVASCRIPT SOURCE DEMONSTRATING THE BRUTE FORCE 
SESSION KEY ATTACK 
 
Lastly, an attacker might try to access the purse of an 
object by trying to call enablePrivacy() on that object 
again. The framework will detect the duplicate call and will 
throw an error. 
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
var Employee = function (ssn) { 
     var purse = this.enablePrivacy(); 
     purse.ssn = ssn; 
}; 
 
HotSausage.lock(); 
 
var e1 = new Employee(“123-45-6789”); 
 
//attacker code 
var purse = HotSausage.Privacy.enableOn(e1); //throws error 
</script>       
 
FIGURE 11 
A SINPPET OF JAVASCRIPT SOURCE DEMONSTRATING THE DUPLICATE 
PRIVACY ENABLEMENT ATTACK 
 
VIII. Privacy Module Vulnerabilities 
Earlier we discussed several weaknesses of the privacy 
module. In this section, we will expand on those weaknesses 
and demonstrate possible attack vectors that exploit them. 
The primary weakness of the framework is its 
dependence on script authors to be security conscientious 
when writing their scripts with HotSausage. We rely on 
them to ensure that any references to purses are not leaked 
to areas of code where they could potentially be exploited 
by an attacker. 
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
var currentPurse; 
 
var Employee1 = function (ssn) { 
     currentPurse = this.enablePrivacy(); 
     purse.ssn = ssn; 
}; 
 
var Employee2 = function (ssn) { 
     var purse = this.enablePrivacy(); 
      
     this.getPurse = function () { 
          return purse; 
     }; 
}; 
 
HotSausage.lock(); 
 
var e1 = new Employee(“123-45-6789”); 
var e2 = new Employee2(“987-65-4321”); 
 
</script>       
 
FIGURE 12 
A SINPPET OF JAVASCRIPT SOURCE DEMONSTRATING A LEAK OF PRIVATE 
DATA 
 
In both of the examples given in the previous figure, an 
attacker would have access to the private ssn property of 
both objects. In the case of e1, the attacker would be able to 
read currentPurse.ssn and in the case of e2, the 
attacker could read e2.getPurse().ssn. By being 
prudent of the limitations of the framework, an author can 
eliminate any attacks of this nature. 
Another vulnerability exists in the reassigning of a 
purse to an object after it is constructed. When 
enablePrivacy() or 
HotSausage.Privacy.enableOn() is used to attach 
a purse to an object, the framework first checks to ensure 
that privacy has not already been enabled on the target 
object as discussed earlier. Internally, the framework does 
this by checking for the existence of the _purse() method 
on the target. If an attacker removes the _purse() method 
from the target and enables privacy on that object again, he 
then has full access to a blank purse where he can put 
whatever properties he would like. The owning object has 
no knowledge of this attack. 
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<script type="text/javascript"> 
//valid code 
var Employee = function (ssn) { 
     var purse = this.enablePrivacy(); 
     purse.ssn = ssn; 
}; 
Employee.privilegedMethod(“getLastFourOfSSN”, function () { 
     return this.ssn.substring(this.ssn.length-4, 4); 
}); 
HotSausage.lock(); 
var e1 = new Employee(“123-45-6789”); 
 
//attacker code 
delete e1._purse; 
var newPurse = HotSausage.Privacy.enableOn(e1); 
newPurse.ssn = “ATTACKEDSSN”; 
e1.getLastFourOfSSN(); //returns “DSSN” 
</script>       
 
FIGURE 13 
A SINPPET OF JAVASCRIPT SOURCE DEMONSTRATING THE PURSE ACCESS 
ATTACK 
 
We are currently implementing a solution to mitigate 
this attack, which will require a script author to register his 
objects with the framework and be supplied a unique key. 
When enabling privacy on those registered objects, the 
proper key will need to be supplied back to the framework 
in order for the operation to complete successfully. This 
strategy still is vulnerable to the primary weakness of the 
framework, information leaks due to author negligence.  If a 
script author accidently makes the key for an object 
available, the above mentioned attack is still possible. 
HOTSAUSAGE PERFORMANCE 
The HotSausage framework necessarily creates overhead on 
objects that have privacy enabled on them. This is due to the 
extra function calls and data initializations required for 
ensuring privacy and secure generation of session keys. We 
created a suite of benchmarks that test the privacy module 
compared with several other traditional methods that have 
been used to protect private properties in JavaScript objects. 
I. Traditional Privacy Mechanisms 
There are two main ways which JavaScript programmers 
traditionally secure private properties of objects, closure 
based protection and naming convention based protection. 
Closure based protection revolves around the concept 
of functional scope in JavaScript. Properties declared in 
JavaScript are only readable within the functional scope that 
they are declared, including in any functional blocks 
declared within that scope. Programmers use this property to 
declare variables in the constructor of an object, and then 
define functions within that constructor that access those 
variables. Since the defined functions are in the functional 
scope of the constructor, they have access to any variables 
declared in the constructor. This effectively ensures privacy 
for those variables, but incurs a high overhead for each 
object since functions declared in the constructor of an 
object are bound to each instance of the object created rather 
than to the prototype of the object itself. 
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
 
var Employee = function (ssn) { 
     this.getLastFourOfSSN = function () { 
          return ssn.substring(this.ssn.length-4, 4); 
     ); 
}; 
 
</script>       
 
FIGURE 14 
A SINPPET OF JAVASCRIPT SOURCE DEMONSTRATING CLOSURE BASED 
PRIVACY 
 
As seen in the above figure, an attacker would have 
only the allowed read access and no write access to the 
variable ssn.  
A second traditional way of securing private properties 
is by using a naming convention that conveys that properties 
are supposed to be private. Although this is a widely used 
technique, it is insecure since properties that are named as 
private are still accessible to an attacker. Commonly, 
JavaScript programmers will use an underscore before the 
name of a property that they wish to designate as private. 
This method has the benefit of incurring a low overhead 
since functions of objects that need to access private 
properties can be bound to that object’s prototype rather 
than to the object itself. 
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
 
var Employee = function (ssn) { 
     this._ssn = ssn; 
}; 
 
Employee.prototype.getLastFourOfSSN = function () { 
     return this._ssn.substring(this._ssn.length-4, 4); 
); 
 
</script>       
 
FIGURE 15 
A SINPPET OF JAVASCRIPT SOURCE DEMONSTRATING NAMING CONVENTION 
BASED PRIVACY 
 
II. Benchmarking Procedure 
We wrote a series of benchmarks that test the privacy 
module against traditional techniques both for object 
construction and private property access. We measured the 
processing time required for many iterations of both 
instances. The benchmarks were run using the Rhino 
JavaScript engine using a variety of optimization levels [12, 
13]. The Rhino engine was chosen to eliminate as many 
variables as possible that browser-based engines may 
introduce and allow for tuning the engine optimization 
settings. 
III. Benchmark Results 
For each of the tests, 1,000 iterations of 10,000 object 
constructions and property accesses were performed. The 
times listed below reflect the mean and standard deviation 
of the processing time for all of the 1,000 iterations. The 
benchmarks were run on an Intel Core 2 Duo T9600 at 2.80 
GHz with 4 GB of main memory. 
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TABLE I 
BENCHMARK RESULTS FOR OBJECT CONSTRUCTION 
Engine 
Optimization 
Level  
Privacy Technique Mean (ms) Standard 
Deviation (ms) 
Interpreted 
Interpreted 
Interpreted 
None 
None 
None 
Full 
Full 
Full 
HotSausage 
Closure 
Naming Convention 
HotSausage 
Closure 
Naming Convention 
HotSausage 
Closure 
Naming Convention  
81.50 
43.82 
22.65 
32.45 
23.69 
8.16 
33.60 
22.91 
7.95 
17.80 
5.25 
0.87 
17.91 
2.68 
1.47 
19.93 
1.81 
1.39 
 
TABLE 2 
BENCHMARK RESULTS FOR PROTECTED PROPERTY ACCESS 
Engine 
Optimization 
Level  
Privacy Technique Mean (ms) Standard 
Deviation (ms) 
Interpreted 
Interpreted 
Interpreted 
None 
None 
None 
Full 
Full 
Full 
HotSausage 
Closure 
Naming Convention 
HotSausage 
Closure 
Naming Convention 
HotSausage 
Closure 
Naming Convention  
144.61 
13.55 
14.61 
59.42 
3.55 
7.55 
61.49 
3.59 
3.09 
53.82 
1.19 
0.75 
52.00 
26.98 
1.39 
49.47 
26.98 
0.89 
 
As can be seen by the above results, HotSausage incurs 
a severe performance penalty for both object construction 
and protected property access versus traditional methods. 
Even given these penalties, we still believe that HotSausage 
is a better solution than the traditional techniques. An object 
with HotSausage privacy enabled on it has a smaller 
memory footprint than a comparable object with closure 
based privacy and is more secure than a comparable object 
using naming convention based privacy. 
It is important to note that these processing times are 
for many iterations of object construction and private 
property access, and when performing each of these tasks a 
small number of times, the differences in the compute times 
required are not measurable. 
TESTING 
To ensure that our framework performs as expected all 
throughout development, we employed an extensive testing 
strategy based upon the behavior driven development 
philosophy. Behavior driven development focuses on using 
natural language to describe the behavior of units of code 
rather than the technical details that power them. It 
minimizes translation between the technical language in 
which the code is written and the domain language spoken 
by the end users [14]. 
I. Testing Framework 
To aid us in our testing, we employed an existing behavior 
driven development testing framework called Jasmine [15]. 
Jasmine allowed us to cleanly express the behavior of our 
units of code and easily write expressive tests to ensure that 
each unit behaved as expected. In addition, Jasmine allowed 
us to write a custom renderer to render the testing output, so 
we were able to more easily determine test results and locate 
problems when tests failed. 
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
 
describe('Priviledged test suite', function () {  
     describe('When HotSausage.Privacy is loaded', function () { 
          it('should be able to add a privileged method to an 
object', function () { 
               var pp; 
    
               var Person = function (ssn) { 
        var purse = this.enablePrivacy(); 
        purse.ssn = ssn; 
 
                    //bad practice, but needed for testing 
                    pp = this; 
               }; 
    
   Person.privilegedMethod("getSSN", function () { 
        expect(this).toEqual(pp);   expect(this.ssn).toBeDefined();
        return this.ssn; 
   }); 
    
   var ssn = "123-45-6789"; 
   var p = new Person(ssn); 
    
   expect(p.getSSN).toBeDefined(); 
   expect(p.getSSN()).toEqual(ssn);  
          }); 
     }); 
}); 
 
</script>       
 
FIGURE 16 
A SINPPET OF JAVASCRIPT SOURCE DEMONSTRATING AN EXAMPLE JASMINE 
TEST 
 
We wrote extensive test suites for all modules of the 
framework, including privacy. We used these test suites to 
ensure that the framework functioned as we intended. We 
ran the test suite after any major edits to the source code to 
verify that the changes that we made did not adversely 
impact the functionality of the framework. If a test 
happened to fail, we investigated the cause of the failure and 
implemented a fix before moving on to the next step in 
development. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 17 
OUR CUSTOM JASMINE TEST OUTPUT 
HOTSAUSAGE CASE STUDY 
To demonstrate our framework in action, we applied it to an 
already existing JavaScript application. This case study of 
the privacy module allowed us to verify the practicality of 
our work and see its overhead in a real world scenario. 
As part of our research, we also work on the Medical 
Device Plug and Play (MDPnP) project [16]. The Medical 
 Device Plug and Play project aims to improve patient safety 
by developing standards for the safe operation and 
communication between medical devices.
of the requirements of the project and developed a mock 
system that demonstrated the possibilities of having medical 
devices function in coordination with each other. From 
initial design to final testing, we utilized a variety of 
technologies, including JavaScript, to implement a 
successful mock environment that integrated actual 
hardware in several scenarios to demonstrate the potential of 
the system [17]. 
The system is composed using mostly JavaScript based 
software models, but also contains hardware interfaces 
written in Java and a user interface written with JavaScript, 
HTML, and Flash [18, 10]. Other tools, such as XML and 
JSON are also used as communications carriers for data 
between components of the system. 
I. Framework Application 
Specifically, we incorporated the HotSausage 
framework in the modules of our system that handled 
creation and storage of patient vital sign data. In our system, 
sensor devices send signals containing data payloads 
through the network to be stored in a repository of data. By 
modifying the output of each sensor device and the accessor 
methods of the storage component, we were able to easily 
integrate the privacy features of HotSausage into the system.
We chose the vital sign creation and storage code to te
framework since its data should by nature be secure, 
immutable, and private. 
    
 
FIGURE 18 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARCHITECTURE OF OUR ME
SIMULATION 
 
Applying the framework to our system 
straightforward process requiring minimal rewr
existing code. The only major changes that were required 
were in the declaration of functions that had access to 
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private data as well as enabling privacy on vital sign objects 
as they were created by sensor devices.
II. Results and Analysis 
After HotSausage was applied to our MDPnP system, we 
were able to analyze the effectiveness, performance, and 
usability of the modified system.
The framework behaved exactly as expected when 
applied to an actual application. Since the application was 
previously using closure-based privacy features, the 
conversion to HotSausage-based privacy had no change on 
the interface of the objects or on their functionality. We 
noted that the privacy of the data stored in each object was 
still subject to the same effective pr
but without the overhead that is attached to closure
privacy. 
Although we did not instrument the MDPnP system 
before and after HotSausage application to get firm data, we 
did not notice any major performance impacts on the 
operation of the system. We decided not to instrument the 
system because the number of vital sign objects that are 
created and accessed per second in the system is relatively 
low (<100), and based on previous benchmarks of the 
framework, this low number of
measureable using the finite clocks that JavaScript provides. 
The bottlenecks in the application remained the same as 
before the application of the 
interactive components of the user interface.
III. Conclusions 
The framework behaved exactly as expected when applied 
to a real-world JavaScript application. All functionality that 
we had guaranteed through unit testing worked as expected. 
At first, we were wary that the performance penalties that 
we noted during our benchmarking would be a hindrance in 
real-world use, but that proved not to be the case.
mentioned earlier, the number of instantiations of privacy
enabled objects and accesses to private data were too small 
to be measureable by the techniques that we ha
disposal and no human
responsiveness was detected. This small case study provided 
evidence that our framework is practical, usable, and 
provides the security features that it intends. 
CONCLUSIONS AND 
Although HotSausage is not 
advantages are already apparent. 
templates modules are not quite mature, the privacy module 
is almost ready for deployment into actual applications.
Our analysis of the privacy module h
identify several weaknesses and vulnerabilities, but we feel 
that we have addressed them to the best of our abilities. We 
have checks in place already to prevent the majority of 
vulnerabilities found, and have an implementation in 
progress for the attack that was discovered during our 
analysis. Although we have also discovered several 
vulnerabilities that cannot be addressed with our current 
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solution, such as programmer negligence, we hope that by 
providing adequate documentation we will reduce or 
eliminate any attacks that take advantage of this weakness in 
our framework. 
The most significant obstacle that we encountered 
during our implementation and analysis was performance. 
The additional processing overhead introduced by 
HotSausage is quite significant, although we contend that 
this additional work required is worth the functionality that 
the framework provides. Its advantages over both traditional 
types of JavaScript privacy are considerable and should be 
taken into account when authors choose which type of 
privacy strategy to employ in their applications. Our case 
study on our medical device simulation proved that our 
framework not only functions as it was designed to, but also 
is practical in real world applications. 
In the future, we plan to continue to develop 
HotSausage and release it as open source software for 
inclusion in real world applications. The majority of work in 
the privacy module will be directed towards addressing the 
vulnerability discussed earlier and reducing the processing 
footprint of enabling privacy on an object and accessing 
private properties of an object. Lastly, we are considering 
aligning our codebase with the standards of CommonJS to 
facilitate its use as a library in both client and server-side 
applications [19]. We hope that by completing and releasing 
this framework to the community, we will be able to allow 
developers to write safer, more tamper resistant code with 
minimal effort. 
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FIGURE 19 
HE LIFECYCLE OF THE PURSE AND PRIVILEGED METHODS 
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